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Cyber Governance:                                                           
Challenges, Solutions, and Lessons for Effective Global Governance
Executive Summary
Cyberspace permeates global social and economic relations in the 21st Century. It is an integral part of the critical 
infrastructure on which modern societies depend and has revolutionized how we communicate and socialize.  
The governance of cyberspace is, therefore, an indispensable component of global governance, and a testing 
ground for new models of cooperation that could be adapted for effective governance in other areas.
The purpose of this policy brief is to provide policymakers with insights on how to improve the effectiveness 
of cyber governance institutions and processes. These insights could also inform efforts to improve global 
governance institutions and processes more broadly. The brief considers two principal questions: Who should 
govern cyberspace, and how? In response to the former question, the authors review multistakeholder models 
of governance and provide recommendations for their improvement. These include: greater transparency of 
decision-making processes, with a prohibition on vetoes; dedicating financial resources to the empowerment 
of disadvantaged stakeholders; and allocating leadership positions in an equitable manner. In response to the 
latter question, the authors assess formal and informal approaches to governance in cyberspace, concluding 
that cyberspace should be governed through a combination of both. That is, a flexible, incremental and 
sectoral approach to strengthening the rule of law in cyberspace through international treaty-making should be 
complemented by efforts to build trust and consensus through the development, diffusion and institutionalization 
of norms for responsible behavior in cyberspace, as well as related confidence- and capacity-building measures. 
Taken together, these recommendations aim to foster common understanding and enhance security and the rule 
of law in cyberspace.
This policy brief draws on The Hague Institute’s work on the Global Governance Reform Initiative (GGRI) project 
and the Global Conference on Cyberspace (GCCS), hosted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands in April 2015. 
The GGRI project is a collaborative effort between The Hague Institute, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, and the Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi).
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The first part of this brief asks who should be 
involved in cyber governance, and examines 
multistakeholder models of governance.  
It provides an overview of several multistakeholder 
models that are currently in use, assessing their 
strengths and weaknesses. The section concludes 
with policy recommendations to improve 
multistakeholder governance, both in cyberspace 
and more generally. The subsequent sections 
of the brief focus on how cyberspace should be 
governed. The discussion begins with formal 
governance arrangements such as international 
treaties, and proposes that a flexible, incremental 
and sectoral approach to treaty-making can help 
overcome the reluctance of stakeholders to make 
legally-binding international commitments.  
This would strengthen the rule of law in 
cyberspace and demonstrate the relevance of 
existing international law in non-traditional areas 
of global governance. 
The final section focuses on informal approaches 
to cyber governance, which include norm 
development and confidence- and capacity-
building measures. The discussion here focuses 
on how such approaches can complement formal 
governance by building trust and consensus 
through the development, diffusion and 
institutionalization of norms for responsible 
behavior in cyberspace. Relevant policy 
recommendations are included at the end of each 
section and are summarized in the conclusion.
1.  Who should  
govern 
cyberspace? 
An analysis of 
multistakeholder 
governance
Contemporary understandings of what constitutes 
global governance are increasingly less  
state-centric, recognizing that other stakeholders 
can play an important role. Multistakeholder 
approaches to governance can empower  
non-state actors to participate in the development 
and implementation of international public 
policy, thereby increasing the inclusiveness and 
representativeness of governance processes.
The governance of cyberspace is a particularly 
important case study of multistakeholder 
governance, given its highly decentralized 
nature. Internet governance scholar Laura 
DeNardis describes multistakeholderism in 
cyberspace as “a constantly shifting balance of 
powers between private industry, international 
technical governance institutions, governments 
and civil society”1 For effective governance, 
The governance of cyberspace is complex and contested. The decentralized nature of the 
medium – which is largely owned and operated by the private sector, but is increasingly of 
consequence and interest to governments and civil society – poses a challenge to traditional 
methods of global governance, which are inclined to be state-centric and somewhat 
inflexible. This policy brief aims to provide policymakers with insights on how to improve 
the effectiveness of cyber governance institutions and processes. It focuses particularly 
on insights that may be applicable to global governance institutions and processes more 
generally. 
Introduction
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multistakeholderism should be understood 
not as a value in itself, but rather “a question 
of what form of administration is necessary in 
any particular context.”2  Multistakeholderism 
therefore does not envision that all stakeholders 
should participate in the same manner and to the 
same degree in all governance matters.  
For example, technical matters related to the 
smooth operation of cyberspace are largely 
handled by the private sector, while only states 
– and to some extent international organizations 
– can be party to international treaties 
regulating cyberspace. Non-states actors can 
sign and support “soft” instruments such as the 
NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, and 
play a critical role in shaping, disseminating and 
institutionalizing norms of behavior in cyberspace 
(see also Figure 1 above). Regardless of the 
particular configuration of stakeholders necessary 
for a specific governance task, establishing 
legitimate public policy requires that governance 
processes and mechanisms be both transparent 
and accountable.3  
The evolution of governance arrangements in 
cyberspace has thus far been directed largely by 
stakeholders (primarily states and the private 
sector) in the United States and other Western 
countries. However, there is growing acceptance 
that the future of cyber governance will be heavily 
influenced by stakeholders in non-Western 
nations, such as Brazil, China and India, which 
have rapidly growing populations of Internet 
users and provide a large portion of ICT products 
and services. Even with multistakeholder models 
of governance in place, countries and other 
stakeholders that are relative newcomers to 
cyber governance are often at a disadvantage. 
The disparity between the ability of stakeholders 
from developed and developing countries to 
participate effectively in cyber governance is 
particularly evident.4  Below, we consider several 
multistakeholder cyber governance platforms 
and suggest how these could be improved in 
terms of transparency and accountability, as 
well as empowering previously disadvantaged 
stakeholders to play an effective role in cyber 
governance.
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Figure 1: Functions of stakeholders in cyber governance
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1.1  Multistakeholder 
models of cyber 
governance:  
Strengths and 
weaknesses
 
Contemporary cyber governance encompasses 
several multistakeholder governance fora and 
processes, including the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and the 
Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future 
of Internet Governance (NETmundial). Each 
governance mechanism has unique strengths and 
weaknesses, while all require improvement to be 
legitimate and effective.
ICANN is a private, nonprofit organization, 
which performs key technical tasks to ensure 
the smooth functioning of the Internet. In March 
2014, responding partly to concerns about the 
predominant position of the US in ICANN, the 
US National Telecommunications & Information 
Administration (NTIA) announced its decision 
to transfer its stewardship of key Internet 
domain name functions within ICANN to the 
global multistakeholder community. In theory, 
ICANN takes a community-based, consensus-
driven approach to policymaking through open 
discussion of its policies. To encourage wide 
participation, ICANN’s annual meeting is 
mandated to take place in different geographical 
regions and is free and open to all participants, 
including the public and private sectors as well 
as technical experts. During this meeting, any 
participant can use the Public Forum session to 
address a point directly to members of the ICANN 
community and its Board. However, effective 
participation is often deterred by several factors, 
including colloquial use of the English language 
and Internet availability asymmetries.5   
More importantly, ICANN has been heavily 
criticized for lacking accountability. It has an 
undefined membership, which exerts no control 
over a Board that is appointed “indirectly by 
a nominating committee composed of ICANN 
insiders.”6 Weak review and appeal procedures 
for Board decisions, i.e. non-binding requests 
to reconsider these decisions, make it difficult 
to hold the ICANN Board accountable for its 
decisions and actions.7
 
The ITU is the specialized UN body for 
information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) that allocates global radio spectrum and 
satellite orbits and develops technical standards. 
As a UN body, the ITU is mandated to engage 
with all nation states. Thus, Least Developed 
Countries, which primarily engage in cyber 
governance through the ITU, often see it as  
“the most appropriate forum for governing global 
electronic networks, including the Internet.”8  
However, the ITU’s claim to be a multistakeholder 
governance forum is somewhat hollow, as only 
governments formally perform decision-making 
functions. In recent years, part of the Union’s 
decision-making has been partially delegated to 
Study Groups whose decisions can be final, but 
the membership of these groups is drawn largely 
from telecommunications companies and their 
suppliers.9  There is limited participation of civil 
society organizations, in stark contrast to other 
cyber governance fora that are open and do not 
require membership for participation. 
The IGF, created by the World Summit on the 
Information Society in 2006, brings together 
diverse stakeholders to annual meetings about 
public policy issues pertaining to the Internet 
under the aegis of the UN. It has been praised as 
“a laboratory for new modalities to organize the 
international community.”10 As a non-binding 
forum for debate on Internet governance policy,11 
best practices and emerging issues, the IGF is 
more flexible than a UN summit. It is an open 
forum for “all people with a stake in Internet 
governance.”  As such, all participants have the 
same access and speaking rights, and only online 
registration is required to participate.  
This enables top-down as well as bottom-up 
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initiatives. There has been strong support for the 
renewal of the IGF’s mandate beyond 2015, which 
is to be decided on by the UN General Assembly 
in December 2015.12 However, some argue that 
the IGF’s forums and symbolic interactions often 
seem theatrical, and do not focus on producing 
specific policy outcomes, which pushes the IGF  
(a forum with no negotiated outcome or decision-
making mandate) to the fringes of the core policy 
debates.13 Without the authority to establish 
policies or regulations, it is “unable to influence 
significantly the hard issues and choices at 
stake.”14
 
NETmundial, which took place in April 2014, 
is widely considered to have been a successful 
process of multistakeholder engagement on 
cyber governance issues. Following revelations 
of large-scale data surveillance undertaken by 
the US National Security Agency, the Brazilian 
government initiated NETmundial, which 
brought together four groups of stakeholders 
(governments, the private sector, civil society and 
the academic/technical community) in quasi-
equal numbers, with three levels of participation: 
content submissions through an online platform; 
online public comments on a draft of the outcome 
statement; and open-microphone sessions for 
participants to directly address the plenary. In 
addition, the drafting sessions took place in the 
public eye, making them more transparent. 
The NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement 
drew upon two days of deliberations involving 
over 900 participants and reinforced the concept 
of multistakeholderism, stating that “Internet 
governance should be built on democratic, 
multistakeholder processes, ensuring the 
meaningful and accountable participation of 
all stakeholders …The respective roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders should be 
interpreted in a flexible manner with reference 
to the issue under discussion.”15 However, in its 
assessment of NETmundial, the Association for 
Progressive Communications noted the influence 
of powerful governments, who demanded last 
minute changes (or informal veto) to the pre-final 
text presented to the High-level Multistakeholder 
Committee.16 Despite its successes, NETmundial 
could not forge complete consensus as India, Cuba 
and Russia refused to sign the outcome document. 
1.2  Improving 
multistakeholder 
governance in 
cyberspace 
Multistakeholderism in cyberspace can increase 
representativeness and effectiveness in the 
governance of a complex domain by leveling the 
playing field, preventing the capture of cyberspace 
by any one type of stakeholder, and allowing 
different types of stakeholders authority over 
aspects of governance that they are best equipped 
to handle. However, multistakeholder governance 
also presents a number of challenges that must 
be addressed. Key challenges emerging from 
multistakeholder governance in cyberspace, which 
apply to global governance more generally, include 
the lack of transparency in governance processes; 
the unequal representation of stakeholders; and 
the varying degrees of influence that stakeholders 
wield in shaping international public policy.
The effectiveness and legitimacy of 
multistakeholder governance processes are often 
undermined by a lack of transparency and failure 
to provide stakeholders with proper access to 
relevant information. Organizational rules of 
procedure are “usually set by those that hold 
power and are not subject [to] negotiation between 
the different stakeholders.”17 For example, 
although it is an open forum, IGF processes have 
been criticized for providing asymmetrical access 
to documents (in favour of governments over other 
stakeholders) and making decisions behind closed 
doors.18 Though many institutions document 
their policy processes, decisions can still be taken 
in informal or private settings, giving powerful 
players such as governments direct channels of 
influence.19 
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It is important to recognize that various degrees 
of participation can exist in multistakeholder 
cyber governance mechanisms. In governance 
structures such as the ITU, states hold explicit 
decision-making power and are thus unequal to 
other stakeholders. Even when all stakeholders 
theoretically enjoy equal status, however, genuine 
participation can prove elusive. NETmundial was 
criticized for not facilitating “full participation” 
– “a process where each individual member 
of a decision-making body has equal power to 
determine the outcome of a decision”20 – of 
all stakeholders. Indeed, one representative of 
civil society opined that the meeting failed to 
sufficiently move beyond the status quo in terms 
of balancing the power and influence of different 
stakeholder groups.21 
Regarding the degree of influence wielded by 
different stakeholders in cyber governance, 
there is dispute about whether multistakeholder 
arrangements enable all stakeholders to 
participate in a meaningful way. For example, 
African countries lack representation in leadership 
positions within the structure of ICANN, and 
African civil society groups and representatives 
of industry also have minimal participation.22  
Additionally, civil society participation in cyber 
governance mechanisms has been characterized 
by some as “tokenism,” i.e. participation without 
the possibility of making an actual impact.23 Civil 
society participation encounters further difficulties 
when technical specialists become proxies for 
civil society due to a lack of readily available 
expertise.24
To address the multitude of factors that impede 
the genuine and effective participation of all 
stakeholders in cyber governance mechanisms, 
and indeed in global governance mechanisms 
more broadly, efforts must be made to ensure that 
stakeholders not only have a seat at the table, 
but are also empowered to shape and implement 
international public policy. To this end, the 
following recommendations should be considered:
• Transparency: Decision-making processes 
should be transparent, and decisions 
subject to review; decision-makers should 
be held accountable for their decisions by 
the membership of the relevant governance 
mechanism; and no stakeholder group should 
possess formal or informal veto power, which 
can undermine the inclusive and democratic 
nature of multistakeholder governance 
processes. 
• Empowering disadvantaged stakeholders: 
Multistakeholder governance mechanisms 
should allocate dedicated financial resources 
to develop the capacities of state and non-
state actors that are unable to participate in 
governance processes in a meaningful way 
due to factors including the lack of financial 
resources and/or technical knowledge.
• Equitable participation: Leadership 
positions within governance mechanisms 
should rotate and be allocated in an equitable 
manner that prevents the formation of 
cliques, and ensures that the voices of all 
stakeholders, including civil society and the 
private sector, are heard.
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2. How should 
cyberspace 
be governed? 
Formal 
approaches:
Treaties and the 
rule of law in 
cyberspace
Multistakeholder models of governance improve 
inclusiveness and representativeness in cyber 
governance. However, such models alone cannot 
guarantee security and promote the rule of law 
in cyberspace. While the need to strengthen the 
rule of law in cyberspace is widely recognized, 
international legal commitments in this area 
remain rare. The reluctance of states to make 
legally-binding commitments is unsurprising – 
the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace means that 
how it is governed has important implications for 
the security, economic prosperity and political 
stability of states. However, cyberspace does not 
exist in a legal vacuum, and must contend with 
the international legal regimes that play a critical 
role in global governance in the 21st Century.  
This section proposes a flexible, sectoral approach 
to achieving legally-binding commitments 
regarding “rules of the road” in cyberspace 
to ensure this domain will be “free, open and 
secure.”25
2.1  “Pactophobia” and 
the international rule of 
law in cyberspace
“Pactomania” is the term used by historians 
to denote periods of extensive international 
treaty-making. Cyber governance, however, is 
characterized by the opposite phenomenon: 
“pactophobia,” or a fear of committing to 
international treaties. Despite a wealth of (non-
binding) statements regarding the governance of 
cyberspace (e.g. the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement, the International Code of Conduct on 
Information Security, the Tallinn Manual (2.0), or 
Microsoft’s International Cyber Security Norms), 
binding international agreements remain scarce.  
A notable exception is the Budapest Convention 
on Cybercrime.26 
The reluctance vis-à-vis international treaties 
in cyberspace can be attributed to several 
factors, including reluctance amongst advanced 
cyber powers to limit their options for action in 
cyberspace, and the differing priorities of such 
states, which are a function of security and 
economic imperatives. For example, Western 
nations are particularly concerned with guarding 
against copyright infringement and industrial 
espionage, while protecting the freedom of 
expression online. States such as Russia and 
China, however, are preoccupied with the notion 
of “information security,” while India is focusing 
on transforming public services using information 
technology as part of Prime Minister Modi’s 
“Digital India” program. These diverse, and 
sometimes competing, national priorities cannot 
be reconciled effectively by informal means alone.
That existing international law is applicable to 
cyberspace has been affirmed clearly, in particular 
by the United Nations Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security.27 The UN 
GGE is now engaged in determining exactly how 
international law can be applied to cyberspace. 
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The application of existing legal principles to a 
new domain in this manner is called “grafting.” 
Furthermore, at the national level, numerous 
countries are now enacting cyber legislation 
covering issues such as cybercrime and data 
protection, which may ultimately lead to general 
principles of international law.
Failing to place cyber governance concretely 
within the framework of international law 
undermines the possibility of developing a 
coherent strategy for governing this critical global 
resource, as well as for shaping expectations 
among key players. Moreover, it risks eroding the 
legitimacy and relevance of international law in 
framing contemporary challenges.
2.2  Flexible and 
sectoral approach
Overcoming “pactophobia” and making 
meaningful progress in promoting the rule of law 
in cyberspace requires acknowledgement that a 
“free, open and secure Internet for the benefit of 
all”28 is a matter of such global significance that 
it merits international codification. This means 
moving beyond simply adding “cyber labels” 
to existing international rules, and articulating 
clearly how existing and emerging laws apply 
to cyberspace. Policymakers need to move 
from “grafting” to drafting international legal 
instruments specifically designed for governing 
cyberspace.
In this brief, we propose two principal means 
of overcoming “pactophobia” and progressing 
towards the effective governance of cyberspace: 
(1) making full use of the flexibility provided 
under international treaty law; and (2) adopting a 
sectoral rather than a comprehensive approach to 
treaty-making.
Those who doubt that international treaties are a 
viable means of governing cyberspace often fail to 
appreciate the inherent flexibility of international 
agreements. The International Law of Treaties, as 
laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties,29 offers a number of ways to make 
treaties more acceptable to potential signatories. 
These include opt-outs, political offence 
exceptions, reservations, and termination clauses. 
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime makes 
ample use of such clauses and serves as a useful 
example here.
• Opt-out clauses allow parties to a treaty to 
abstain from applying certain parts of the 
treaty. For instance, the Budapest Convention 
sets out a list of offences related to child 
pornography that are to be criminalized 
under domestic law (Article 9, Budapest 
Convention). Whereas all parties have to 
criminalize “offering or making available  
child pornography through a computer 
system,” the Convention leaves to the 
discretion of the parties whether to apply 
provisions on criminalizing, for instance, 
possession of child pornography in a 
computer system or data storage medium.
• Political offence clauses allow a party to 
refuse to cooperate with another state in 
matters such as extradition (Article 27).  
Likely scenarios for the invocation of 
exceptions would involve treason,  
espionage and sedition.
• Reservations can be issued by states when 
signing up to a treaty to exclude or modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions. In order to 
limit the potential for abuse, the issuing of 
reservations can be prohibited for certain core 
provisions of a treaty, which is the case for the 
Budapest Convention, which uses a positive 
list of articles which allow reservations, while 
disallowing them elsewhere (Article 42).  
For instance, no reservations are allowed with 
regard to criminalizing “systems interference” 
(Article 5), for instance by denial of service 
(DOS) attacks or computer-related fraud 
(Article 8).
• Termination clauses offer states the 
option of withdrawing from an international 
agreement. In the Budapest Convention, 
termination “shall become effective on the 
first day of the month following the expiration 
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of a period of three months after the date of 
receipt of the notification by the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe” (Article 47).  
No country, therefore, is eternally bound by  
a treaty.
The second means of achieving international legal 
codification with regard to cyber issues is adopting 
an incremental, sectoral approach to treaty-
making. This approach can be modeled on the 
international anti-terrorism treaty regime,30 and 
can take the Budapest Convention as a starting 
point. This involves, in the first instance, making 
use of the flexibility afforded by international 
treaty law to promote ratification of existing 
agreements by more countries. In addition, 
policymakers should carefully select specific cyber 
issues on which there is some consensus as a 
basis for drafting viable new agreements.
Cyber issues on which sectoral agreements could 
focus include: cyber security strategies and best 
practices; cyber capacity-building initiatives; 
technical assistance programs for enhancing 
access in remote and underdeveloped areas; 
regulation of dual-use cyber technologies; and 
basic rules of cyber warfare (i.e. turning (parts 
of ) the Tallinn Manual into a treaty). Sectoral 
agreements can help forge broader consensus 
and serve as stepping stones towards a global, 
comprehensive set of rules, such as a cyber 
equivalent to the United Nations Convention for 
the Law of the Sea.
There are, of course, limits to what governance 
through legally-binding agreements can achieve. 
To be effective, treaties must be enforced and 
compliance monitored. Moreover, states – which 
are the traditional parties to international treaties 
– are not the only players to be reckoned with 
in cyberspace. International agreements that 
cannot regulate the behavior of the private sector 
in cyberspace are likely to fail. Despite these 
challenges, the above discussion highlights how 
international law can be harnessed to help govern 
this vast and complex domain. Three principal 
policy recommendations emerge:
• Harness fully the flexibility of 
international treaty law to create viable 
coalitions of states to draft, sign and 
ratify international agreements.
• Adopt an incremental, sectoral approach 
to developing new treaties, selecting 
specific themes and issues on which a 
significant degree of consensus already 
exists.
• Accept that a comprehensive treaty 
for cyber governance is a distant goal, 
towards which sectoral agreements can 
serve as stepping stones. 
 
While flexible international agreements that adopt 
an incremental, sectoral approach are a promising 
means of governing cyberspace, they are not the 
only means of doing so. Ideally, such binding 
agreements should operate in conjunction with 
other, informal modes of governance to which the 
discussion now turns.
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3  How should 
cyberspace 
be governed? 
Informal 
approaches: 
Norms, 
confidence- and 
capacity-building 
measures
Brokering global agreement on how to govern 
a domain as ubiquitous, convoluted and 
transformative as cyberspace is a formidable 
challenge. As discussed previously, cyber 
governance involves bringing together a range 
of stakeholders of unequal standing in terms 
of power and influence on the world stage, and 
attempting to reconcile fundamentally different 
views about the purpose and potential of this 
common resource. International treaties –  
a traditional means of governing global affairs 
– are one type of mechanism through which 
consensus may be forged. However, stakeholders 
are wary of codifying governance practices and 
processes in a comprehensive manner, concerned 
about how this may affect their economic interests 
and security. Moreover, once adopted, cyber 
treaties are likely to face “fatal implementation 
problems involving scope, compliance, and 
verification.”31 In such situations, informal 
approaches, which are based on current practice 
and leverage existing relationships, offer valuable 
opportunities for consensus-building and creating 
a template for effective, rules-based governance.
This section elaborates on three types of 
informal approaches to cyber governance: 
developing norms for responsible state behavior 
in cyberspace; confidence-building measures; 
and capacity-building measures. It should be 
noted at the outset that the current discussion 
on norm development and confidence- and 
capacity-building in cyberspace focuses largely 
on state actors. This does not imply that other 
stakeholders are unimportant; it simply reflects 
the political reality that “nation-states are still 
the most powerful actors internationally and we 
are seeing the steady, incremental expansion of 
sovereign control into cyberspace.”  This section 
will therefore focus primarily on state actors.
3.1  Developing 
norms for responsible 
state behavior in 
cyberspace
Norms can be defined as “shared expectations of 
proper behavior,”33 and can be either affective (i.e. 
following custom and practice) or aspirational (i.e. 
seeking to shape current behavior).34 Both types 
of norms can be observed at play in cyberspace. 
Cooperation within the technical community is 
often based on established practice, while both 
states and the private sector have sought to 
influence state behavior in cyberspace through 
initiatives such as the Global Conference on 
Cyberspace35 and Microsoft’s International Cyber 
Security Norms.36 Norms can be addressed to 
both state and non-state actors. For example, the 
Global Commission on Internet Governance has 
proposed a Social Compact for Digital Privacy 
and Security “between citizens and their elected 
representatives, the judiciary, law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies, business, civil society 
and the Internet technical community.”37  
Norms can be difficult to crystallize and 
disseminate, but it is possible to identify three 
qualities that enable a norm to gain traction 
internationally: clarity, utility and do-ability.38  
Successful norms, therefore, are those that are 
organized around clear principles; demonstrate a 
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connection between norm-following and desired 
outcomes; and provide guidance on how to 
comply.39
There are several advantages to adopting a 
normative approach to governing cyberspace. 
Norms are not necessarily legally-binding, and 
are therefore less affected by the trust-deficit 
that can cripple attempts to negotiate, sign, and 
ratify international treaties.40 The discourse on 
norms can also create a safe rhetorical space 
in which to discuss the different needs and 
values of stakeholders without creating explicit 
hierarchies.41 This is particularly valuable, 
given that “the very essence of cyberspace holds 
different meanings among States with varying 
conceptions of the role of the State and the 
degree of sovereignty it may wish to assert.”42  
Exploring what various stakeholders consider 
to be appropriate and responsible behavior in 
cyberspace provides an opportunity to create 
coalitions of like-minded actors who could 
agree broadly on the substance of a given norm. 
Consistent practice, even within a small group, 
can foster broader acceptance of a norm – for 
instance, through confidence- and capacity-
building measures – which may ultimately result 
in a binding international agreement.
There are, however, some disadvantages to 
normative approaches. It has been argued that 
the discourse on norms is dominated by Western 
values and perspectives, and does not capture 
different imaginaries of cyberspace that exist 
elsewhere.43 This, coupled with the rise of non-
Western cyber powers like Brazil, India and 
China, underscores that in order to gain wide 
acceptance and legitimacy, norms will have to 
identify and articulate global values, rather than 
national or regional ones. Another disadvantage of 
governance through norms concerns the inability 
to influence the behavior of powerful state and 
non-state actors that can act unilaterally to 
undermine a free, open and secure cyberspace. 
While there may be a diplomatic cost to flouting 
widely upheld norms, this alone is unlikely to be 
an effective form of deterrence for determined 
actors.
It is also worthwhile considering what would 
constitute progress in norm development in 
cyberspace. Such progress can be measured along 
three axes: the number of stakeholders who accept 
a given norm; the degree of ambition in terms of 
the content of the norm; and the degree to which 
the norm is legally-binding (only this third feature 
relates directly to formal governance). Trade-offs 
exist between the three categories, which makes 
it difficult to achieve progress along all three axes 
simultaneously. For example, building consensus 
between a small number of states on norms 
that reflect the status quo, and doing so in the 
form of a non-binding, declaratory document is 
relatively easy. However, the more norms deviate 
from the status quo, and/or grow more legally-
binding, the less likely it is that a significant 
number of stakeholders will subscribe to the 
norm. Movement along any of these axes could be 
considered progress, however, given the complex 
and dynamic nature of cyber governance.
The wide dissemination and institutionalization  
of norms does not happen automatically.  
In the domain of cyberspace, confidence- and 
capacity-building measures play an important 
role in promoting norms by fostering trust and 
cooperation between stakeholders and forging 
consensus on how to govern specific aspects 
of cyberspace. These measures are explored in 
greater detail below.
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3.2  Confidence-  
and capacity- 
building measures  
in cyberspace
Confidence-building measures are not new 
to the realm of international relations. Such 
measures have long been used in areas such 
as arms control to mitigate uncertainty or 
mistrust, thereby preventing the escalation of 
conflict between states.44 Confidence-building 
measures in cyberspace “work towards clarifying 
the parameters of States’ perspectives and 
expectations in cyberspace through the sharing of 
national security frameworks, military doctrines, 
and other crisis-managements tools that could be 
useful in reducing uncertainty.”45 
The UN GGE and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have both 
articulated a range of concrete confidence-
building measures for cyberspace, which include 
“exchanges of information on national [cyber 
security] strategies, organizations … and decision-
making processes, sharing of ICT security 
incidents, and mechanisms for cooperation 
amongst law enforcement communities,” as well 
as holding regular consultations, sharing best 
practices, and instituting national legislation to 
facilitate bilateral cooperation.46
It is clear that confidence-building in cyberspace 
focuses heavily on the area of cyber security. 
This makes sense, as it allows states to build 
on the cooperation that already exists between 
technical and law enforcement communities in 
order to tackle thornier issues, such as national 
security. It also highlights how cooperation on 
specific issues or sectors can be expanded to 
address more complex issues, once the requisite 
trust has been built. This provides support for the 
argument advanced in the previous section of this 
brief in favor of adopting an incremental, sectoral 
approach to negotiating international agreements.
Capacity-building is a less obvious, but no less 
important means of creating consensus on a range 
of cyber issues. As defined by the United Nations, 
capacity-building is meant to “invent, develop 
and maintain institutions and organizations that 
are capable of learning and bringing about their 
own continuing transformation, so that they can 
better play a dynamic role to sustain national 
development processes.”47 While cyber capacity-
building efforts may at first glance appear to be 
little more than technical assistance, they can be 
“foreign policy tool[s] used to advance national 
interests … and norms,” thus achieving “deep 
societal and political transformation.”48
The Council of Europe’s efforts to assist countries 
in the implementation of the Budapest Convention 
– for instance, through making local legislation 
fully compliant with the Convention and European 
data protection standards – provides an example 
of how capacity-building can be a vehicle for 
promoting particular values and norms of behavior 
in cyberspace.49 Similarly, the ITU provides 
capacity-building assistance aimed at harmonizing 
the legal and regulatory frameworks for electronic 
communications in recipient countries.50 Finally, 
the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise – a capacity-
building platform launched during the 2015 Global 
Conference on Cyberspace – has the explicit 
goal of undertaking efforts that are consistent 
with international legal frameworks (e.g. UDHR, 
ICCPR, UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights) and a multistakeholder model of 
governance.51 
While capacity-building can be an effective 
and strategic means of ensuring that different 
stakeholders adhere to specific standards of 
behavior in cyberspace, it is important that 
such efforts are not coopted by powerful actors 
with narrow interests. Capacity-building should 
ultimately enable all stakeholders – donors and 
recipients – to access and utilize cyberspace on 
an equal footing by brokering genuine agreement 
on how this is best achieved. Such efforts should 
therefore combine top-down and bottom-up 
processes, and reflect the actual needs of recipient 
countries as well as the shared values of donors 
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and recipients.
The discussion in this section gives rise to three 
policy recommendations, which have implications 
for global governance beyond the domain of 
cyberspace:
• Norms are useful for building trust and 
consensus in situations where states 
remain reluctant to make legally-binding 
commitments. Norms should be clear, 
useful and do-able to gain traction, and 
should strive to articulate global values.
• The dissemination and 
institutionalization of norms should 
be supported by confidence-building 
measures that seek to build on existing 
cooperation, and expand cooperation to 
more difficult issues once trust has been 
built.
• Capacity-building can be an effective and 
strategic means of promoting core values 
and standards of behavior in cyberspace. 
These efforts should safeguard the 
interests of both donor and recipient 
countries and preserve a free, open and 
secure cyberspace.
Conclusion
This policy brief focused on how to make cyber 
governance more effective, and extrapolated 
general lessons for effective global governance. 
Three sets of recommendations emerge from this 
analysis, and can be summarized as follows:
• Multistakeholder models of governance 
can empower non-state actors to participate 
in the development and implementation 
of international public policy. The 
representativeness and effectiveness of 
multistakeholder governance models can 
be improved by greater transparency of 
decision-making procedures, including a 
prohibition on the use of vetoes; dedicating 
financial resources to enable disadvantaged 
stakeholders to participate in governance 
processes in a meaningful way; and allocating 
leadership positions in an equitable manner.
• Formal arrangements, in particular 
international treaty-making, are an important 
means of global governance. Policymakers 
should make full use of the flexibility 
provided by international law to create 
viable coalitions of states willing to adopt 
international agreements on specific themes. 
These agreements may serve as stepping 
stones towards as a comprehensive treaty 
in the long-term. Such an approach bolsters 
the rule of law in cyberspace and strengthens 
the credibility and relevance of international 
law in governing dynamic, multistakeholder-
driven domains.
• Recognizing the limits of formal legal 
approaches, the brief underscores the need for 
informal approaches to global governance, 
which include developing and advancing 
norms that are clear, useful and do-able in 
order to build trust and consensus reflective 
of global values. Confidence-building 
measures can support the dissemination 
and institutionalization of these norms by 
building on existing forms of cooperation, 
and expanding cooperation to more difficult 
issues once trust has been built. Capacity-
building is an effective and strategic means 
of promoting core values and standards of 
behavior in cyberspace, and should safeguard 
the interests of both donor and recipient 
countries.
Many important questions remain about how to 
improve the effectiveness of current processes 
and mechanisms of global governance, both 
within the area of cyber governance and beyond. 
With regard to multistakeholderism, how can 
we ensure that the contributions of non-state 
actors to global governance go beyond tokenism 
and have an actual impact on the development 
and implementation of global public policy? 
How can political realities and state interests be 
balanced with the need for full transparency and 
accountability in governance? Is it possible to 
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